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A Turn to Non-State Actors: Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in 
War-Torn Areas of Limited Statehood
Heike Krieger
Abstract:
Many of the perpetuated armed conflicts in the Great Lakes Region in Africa take place in war-
torn areas of limited statehood. These conflicts are characterized by a high number of civilian 
victims, often resulting from utter disregard for international humanitarian law. Here, the rise 
of armed, violent non-state actors collides with the State-centric traditional nature of public 
international law. Thus, (classical) compliance structures seem to lose their significance, as they 
predominantly rely on the State for law enforcement and therefore mainly accommodate States’ 
interests when inducing compliance. The working paper suggests that the international com-
munity responds to these challenges by allocating competences to other actors than the State. 
Particularly, international organizations increasingly contribute to enforcing international hu-
manitarian law. However, since these organizations are dependent on their member States’ 
political willingness to support measures for inducing compliance effectively, a proliferation of 
humanitarian non-state actors can be observed that step in where third States and international 
organizations are reluctant to act. The paper investigates reasons for compliance and arrives at 
the conclusion that traditional motives rooted in a logic of consequences, as well as appropriate-
ness are still valid and must therefore be addressed by the corresponding compliance mecha-
nisms. These compliance mechanisms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Persuasion 
and incentives work more effectively if they are used under a shadow of hierarchy thrown by 
coercive legal enforcement instruments, such as international criminal justice and UN targeted 
sanctions. These instruments are in turn more effective if they are part of a concerted effort.
Zusammenfassung:
Viele der Konflikte in der afrikanischen Region der Großen Seen werden in gewaltoffenen 
Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit geführt. Die hohe Anzahl ziviler Opfer ist dabei auch auf die 
Miss-achtung des humanitären Völkerrechts zurückzuführen. Seine Steuerungswirkung ist 
im Hinblick auf bewaffnete Gruppen in Frage gestellt, denn seine Anreizstrukturen scheinen 
auf staat-liche Interessen und staatliche Durchsetzungsinstrumentarien gerichtet zu sein. Der  
vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern die Internationale Gemeinschaft auf diese Heraus-
forderungen reagiert. Es lässt sich beobachten, dass vor allem internationale Organisationen 
Aufgaben bei der Durchsetzung des humanitären Völkerrechts übernehmen. Angesichts der 
Dominanz staatlicher Interessen in diesen Organisationen treten in zunehmenden Maße 
NGOs hinzu, die versuchen, bewaffnete Gruppen in Durchsetzungsinitiativen einzubinden. 
Der Beitrag beleuchtet Gründe für die Befolgung humanitären Völkerrechts unter den Bedin-
gungen von Konflikten in gewaltoffenen Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit und gelangt zu dem 
Ergebnis, dass traditionelle Befolgungsanreize auch weiterhin relevant sein können. Zugleich 
wird dargelegt, dass sich die Wirksamkeit der Durchsetzungsinstrumentarien erhöht, wenn sich 
hierarchische Steuerungsinstrumente, wie gezielte UN-Sanktionen und internationale Straf-
gerichtsbarkeit, sowie nicht-hierarchische Steuerungsmechanismen gegenseitig ergänzen.
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1. Introduction
Many of the perpetuated armed conflicts in the Great Lakes Region in Africa take place in war-
torn areas of limited statehood. Fragmented armed groups fight each other or the armed forces 
of a government, which represents only the remainder of collapsed State structures. These con-
flicts are characterized by a high number of civilian victims, often resulting from utter dis-
regard for international humanitarian law. While the government is unable to implement and 
enforce rules and decisions because the State has lost its monopoly over the means of force1, 
the rise of armed, violent non-state actors collides with the State-centric traditional nature of 
public international law. Thus, (classical) compliance structures in international humanitarian 
law seem to lose their significance, as  they predominantly rely on the State for law enforcement 
and therefore mainly accommodate States’ interests when inducing compliance.2
However, if the State is no longer able to enforce the law or comply with it, the question arises as 
to who may replace the State and compensate for its failure (Risse/Börzel 2012: 9, 11). Beginning 
with an analysis of the State’s restricted capabilities to induce compliance in areas of limited 
statehood (2.), this paper submits that, to some extent, non-state actors3 may compensate for the 
State’s failure. Taking into account empirical political science studies on compliance, the paper 
argues that such non-state actors have a twofold role to play: as addressees of compliance efforts 
as well as normentrepreneurs and norm inducers. This paper contends that there is no real 
alternative other than to engage with armed groups (3.). Here, despite of the conflicts’ changing 
character, traditional incentives (reciprocity, self-interest, reputation) still matter for inducing 
the willingness to comply with the law. Yet, a severe dilemma arises: the necessity to engage 
with armed groups contradicts basic interests of States in general, and of the governments con-
cerned in particular. Since efforts to improve compliance with international humanitarian law 
must take into account the position and the interests of armed groups, non-state actors, NGOs 
in particular, have become an essential part in the overall pattern of inducing compliance, 
since they can act more independently of State interests (4.). However, even though their per-
ceived neutrality increases their role in compliance, only a mix of instruments will improve the 
mechanisms’ effectiveness.
1  Risse/Börzel, (2012: 10); see on failing States Geiss, (2005); Thürer (2009).
2  In the general discussion, the terms ‘compliance’ and ‘enforcement’ are used. While ‘enforcement’ 
refers to coercive measures, ‘compliance’ is a broader concept which includes both hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical instruments; see Bothe (2008).
3  The term is used here in a broad sense, encompassing all actors which are not directly related to 
the State; for such a use see Wagner (2010: para. 1); from a juridical perspective, the differentiation is 
often drawn between public actors such as the State or State-empowered international organizations, 
and private actors, such as transnational enterprises and non-governmental organizations; see Wagner 
(2010: para. 3).
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2. Restricted capabilities of States to induce compliance 
National enforcement mechanisms seldom work appropriately in areas of limited statehood. 
Armies often lack a strict and stable military hierarchy; hence, military discipline is barely main-
tained and the risk of mutiny is high. For instance, the armed group M23, which was respon-
sible for a rebellion in the eastern DRC in 2012, consisted of soldiers who had mutinied against 
the Congolese State Army (HRW 2012). Moreover, it is at the very least doubtful that training and 
instruction of soldiers includes an adequate introduction to international humanitarian law 
as envisaged in Article 83 AP I. Since the criminal justice system is often affected by the break-
down of State structures, military justice may not work as a means of enforcement either (Lamp 
2011: 233). This is acknowledged by Article 17 of the ICC-Statute, which lays down the principle 
of complementarity. According to Article 17 para. 1 lit a), a case before the ICC is inadmissible 
if it is being investigated by a State that has jurisdiction, unless the State is genuinely unable 
to carry out the investigation. Article 17 para. 3 of the ICC-Statute defines inability as follows: 
‘In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a 
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable 
to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out 
its proceedings’.
Based on an interpretation of Article 17 para. 3 of the ICC-Statute, some criteria can be iden-
tified that illustrate when and why a judicial system is incapable of enforcing international 
humanitarian law. The Trial Chambers, the reports of the Office of the Prosecutor, as well as 
international human rights standards, help to shape the meaning of a substantial collapse (Wil-
liams/Schabas 2008: 624) as the lack of a viable legal infrastructure, in particular with a view 
to protection of fair trial standards and rights of the accused; inaccessibility of the courts; in-
sufficient material resources and experienced and independent judicial personnel; the lack of 
adequate operative law and of a sufficient infrastructure for investigations, in particular with a 
view to police capability; as well as an adequate system for the protection of victims.4 In addition 
to criteria concerning the quality of the judicial system, the general situation, especially with 
regard to the security situation, has to be taken into account.5 The latter criterion is particularly 
decisive because the travaux préparatoires reveal that many African States did not want Article 
17 to apply in the absence of full compliance with human rights standards (Kastner 2010: 136).
The situation in the DRC is a case in point. While President Kabila had admitted Congo’s in-
ability to try Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in its national judicial system, upon referring the situation 
in the DRC to the ICC in 2004,6 Trial Chamber I decided in 2006 that the judicial system had 
4  UNSC, 5459th meeting (14 June 2006) UN Doc. S/PV.5459, p. 3; HRW (January 2004: 6); Burke-White 
(2005: 576).
5  UNSC, 5459th meeting, above note 4, p. 3.
6  ICC-01/04-01/06-32-US-Exp-AnxA1, 21 March 2004: “En raison de la situation particulière que con-
naît mon pays, les autorités competentes non sont malheureusement pas en mesure de mener des 
enquêtes sur les crimes mentionnés ci-dessus ni d’engager les poursuites nécessaires sans la partici-
pationde la Cour Pénale Internationale.”
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already improved.7 In response to the ICC’s activities with regard to the DRC, parts of the gov-
ernment had pushed for judicial reforms in order to claim that there was no need for comple-
mentary ICC proceedings (Burke-White 2005: 570). However, observers from the DRC suggest 
that the military justice system still faces severe handicaps when dealing with war crimes. As of 
2012, only about 15 cases had been tried before military tribunals in the DRC concerning war 
crimes committed between 1998 and 2003. None of these cases concerned high-ranking com-
manding officers.8 The reasons for these shortcomings are diverse and reflect the challenges 
with which law compliance is confronted in areas of limited statehood. While the UN Security 
Council has repeatedly called on the DRC to stop impunity (UNSC Resolution 1565 01.10.2004: 
para. 5 g), national efforts on this topic have faced numerous legal, political and social chal-
lenges. It is doubtful that there is an adequately operative legal system in place to deal with seri-
ous human rights violations (Kumbu forthcoming). Criminal legislation enacted in the wake of 
the ‘Second Congo War’ lacked consistency and deviated significantly from the ICC Statute, for 
instance by omitting certain crimes such as forced disappearances and recruiting children in 
the armed forces, or entirely excluding penalties for the commission of war crimes (Kahombo 
forthcoming). Moreover, Congolese civilian courts are generally not competent to prosecute 
serious human rights violations; accordingly, military courts will decide on most cases (Kumbu 
forthcoming; Burke-White 2005: 583). It is widely believed that the judiciary is devoid of political 
independence (Kumbu forthcoming; Burke-White 2005: 577). A lack of material resources also 
hinders the judiciary from efficient investigations and domestic prosecutions (Burke-White 
2005: 566). It is unlikely that victims will receive any monetary compensation (Kumbu forth-
coming; Kahombo forthcoming). These shortcomings within the legal system are aggravated 
by a politically biased incoherent prosecution policy (Kahombo forthcoming; HRW 04.03.2012). 
Human Rights Watch stated in 2004: 
‘The DRC’s judicial system has had little investment over the past decade. Most of the 
courts do not function. Its personnel have not been paid for years and magistrates are 
badly trained and unsupported. Mismanagement or corruption often characterizes 
cases that are heard, sometimes fuelling community grievances and furthering 
conflict. Lack of confidence in the judiciary’s administration of justice is widespread. 
Not a single political crisis of a constitutional nature has been resolved by the judiciary. 
Politicians and businesses are reluctant to bring their disputes to the courts. The 
general population similarly lacks confidence in the judiciary. It is estimated that 
only a very small percentage of disputes end up in courts of law, not because parties 
to the disputes have better options, but because they are so suspicious of the judiciary 
that they prefer other means, including the police, security services, the military, or 
traditional arbitration in rural areas. Victims of human rights abuses are generally 
reluctant to utilize judicial mechanisms for redress.(HRW January 2004: 5)’
7  Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest) ICC-01/04-
01/06-8 (10 February 2006), para. 36.
8  Kahombo (forthcoming); Kumbu (forthcoming); Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict (22 May 2012) UN Doc. S/2012/376, p. 2; HRW (04.03.2012).
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Moreover, there is a continued risk that the fragile peace process will be undermined by serious 
criminal prosecutions (Burke-White 2005: 566; HRW 04.03.2012). Thus, it was reported that the 
M23 armed group justified its rebellion with the government’s alleged failure to carry out the 
peace agreement of 23 May 2009. The agreement was concluded between the DRC government 
and the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), on the basis of which the CNDP was 
recognized as an official political party. Its military wing was also integrated into the State’s 
armed forces.9 In part, the rebellion was led by General Ntaganda and seen as a reaction against 
the government’s efforts to destabilize his position inter alia by pushing calls for his arrest and 
transfer to the ICC (HRW 2012).
3. Engaging armed groups
Where the State has lost control over territory and people, international humanitarian law as-
sumes, as stated in Common Article 3 GC and Additional Protocol II that within their area of 
control armed groups assume responsibility. Thus, efforts to induce compliance must engage 
armed groups as much as they engage States. 
3.1 Restricted capabilities of armed groups to induce compliance
However, a restricted capacity to comply is not only characteristic of State actors in areas of 
limited statehood. Violent non-state actors will often have not (yet) established stable and effec-
tive structures with strong leadership required to guarantee effective compliance. The capacity 
of armed groups to train and instruct members and to take disciplinary, as well as punitive, 
sanctions differs considerably.10 Likewise, the ability to act at the international level on the basis 
of central command and control structure also varies. However, empirical research strong-
ly suggests that compliance with international humanitarian law requires an authority with 
competence for decision-making and negotiating with public and private international actors. 
Thus, accountability can be allocated to a central command with the minimum clarity legally 
required.11
One way to address these challenges is for the law to try to adapt its normative preconditions to 
the facts on the ground by attempting to adequately address the factual situation. International 
humanitarian law has established a two-tiered system for the applicable law: only armed groups 
which fulfil the demanding threshold of Article 1 para. 1 are bound by Additional Protocol II. 
In all other cases of non-international armed conflict, the minimum standard of Common 
9  http://africanhistory.about.com/od/glossarym/g/def-M23.htm; see also Special Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Region (27 February 2013) 
UN Doc. S/2013/119, p. 4 et seq. 
10  Official Working Document of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, Geneva Oc-
tober 2007, at p. 47.
11  Jo/ Bryant(2013: 243); for a legal discussion of the required degree of centralization and organization 
see La Rosa and  Wuerzner, (2008: 329); Sivakumaran (2012: 175).
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Article 3 GC applies.12 Such an approach is, inter alia, justified because compliance with some of 
the obligations under the AP II, such as Article 4 and 5 AP II, requires sufficiently stable (infra-) 
structures.13 This linkage between obligation and compliance is explicitly laid down in Article. 
1 para. 1 AP II, which requires ‘dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, 
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.’14 
The high threshold of AP II can be seen as a realistic approach, since the prerequisites – ‘being 
under responsible command and in control of a part of the territory concerned’ – reflect those 
circumstances on the ground that will allow an armed group to comply with the Protocol.15 
Thus, according to the ICRC Commentary, while it is not necessary that armed groups be orga-
nized as efficiently as regular armed forces, an organization is required that is inter alia ‘capable 
[…] of imposing discipline in the name of a de facto authority’.16 Likewise, in cases of Common 
Article 3 GC, a lower degree of organization and control is required, which nonetheless en-
ables the armed group to comply with the obligations under that Article.17 Consequently, inter- 
national humanitarian law has long acknowledged the rise of violent non-state actors and cre-
ated obligations whose applicability depends primarily on the armed groups’ capacity to com-
ply.18 
3.2 Flaws in the willingness to comply 
However, even if there is at least a rudimentary capability to comply, this is not sufficient to 
motivate any actor to actually do so. In some conflicts, at least half of the number of dead civil-
ians can be attributed to the actions of armed groups (Bangerter 2011: 356). Thus, the question 
remains as to whether adequate safeguards to guarantee an armed group’s willingness to com-
ply have been built into the international (legal) system. 
3.2.1 Identifying an actor’s reasons for compliance
 ‘Compliance with an international obligation means a behaviour or a situation which is in con-
formity with the international obligations of a subject of international law.’19 In order to induce 
such behaviour, it is necessary to identify reasons why actors comply with the law. International 
Relations and International Legal Theory alike have identified manifold reasons for compli-
12  International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva, 1987), Art. 1, p. 1348, no. 4447. 
13  Ibid., Art. 1, p. 1352, no. 4466.
14  For indicia when the required degree of organization is fulfilled see Sivakumaran, (2012: 170 et seq.).
15  ICRC Commentary, above note 12, Art. 1, p. 1353, no. 4470; Sassóli / Shani (2011: 430 et seq.).
16  ICRC Commentary, above note 12, Art. 1, p. 1352, no. 4463.
17  Moir (2002: 36); see also on the linkage between status and ability to comply: Prosecutor v. Ljube Boskoski 
and Johan Tarculovski (Judgment) ICTY IT-04-82-T (10 July 2008), para. 196; Zegveld (2002: 140).
18  International criminal tribunals, however, apparently do not put much emphasis on this prerequisite, 
see Sivakumaran (2012: 177 et seqq.).
19  Bothe (2008: para. 1); from the perspective of social sciences: Jo/Bryant (2013: 241).
A Turn to Non-State Actors  |  10
ance. Most of the conclusions are based on theoretical considerations, though some do stem 
from empirical analysis. Some approaches are concerned with international law in general; 
others focus on the laws of war in particular. In both fields, there are vivid discussions about 
which theory is most appropriate to explain the reason for compliance with international law. 
It is not the aim of the present analysis to discuss flaws in the various compliance theories, 
but rather to deduce reasons for compliance from the diverging theories, as well as from those 
few empirical studies of compliance with international humanitarian law. Such an eclectic 
approach might be criticized as lacking theoretical consistency. However, while coherence is 
an important advantage of an explanation based on one particular theory, at the same time it 
creates the risk of either an actor driven or structure driven bias (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 913). 
Since the different theories advance, at least partly, motives that derive from different levels of 
analysis, they work complementarily. Given the circumstances of its applicability in a ‘situation 
of disorder’ (Bothe 2008: para. 66), compliance with the laws of war is a particularly complex 
issue which requires taking into account these different perspectives and levels of analysis. This 
multilevel approach is reflected in the mix of instruments which international law has devel-
oped for ensuring actors’ compliance with it (Bothe 2000: 23; Ratner 2011: 485). 
The present analysis assumes that actors only partly – if at all – comply with a rule just because 
it is the law. Therefore, it does not focus on the structure of the norm, its coherence or its de-
terminacy as a prerequisite for compliance (on these prerequisites: Franck 1995: 30). Instead, it 
inquires as to the relation between the law and an actor’s social behaviour (Burgstaller 2005: 85). 
On this basis an actor’s willingness to comply with a norm of international law can be concep-
tualized in two ways: by a so-called logic of appropriateness and by the logic of consequences 
(March/Olsen 1998: 949). Compliance because of self-interest and reciprocal behaviour, fear of 
sanctions and reputation follows the logic of consequences, while the logic of appropriateness 
furthers legitimacy, substantial moral agreement, as well as habit and a sense of duty, as com-
pliance motives (Schmelzle 2011: 9). Accordingly, it is necessary to identify the relevant norm 
addressees, since motives for compliance may vary according to the position the actors hold 
in the international system. Traditionally, compliance theory focuses on the question of why 
States comply with international law (Bothe 2008: para. 4). Although these theories take into 
account that non-state actors play a decisive role, they ultimately focus on the State ‘as the 
engine and target of compliance’ (Ratner 2011: 485). However, this approach is flawed. It is the 
rise of non-state actors in war-torn areas of limited statehood that challenges the traditional 
compliance structure of international humanitarian law and requires a broader perspective. 
Especially in international humanitarian law and international criminal law, there are others 
actors with international legal personality that must comply with the norms. Armed groups are 
bound by the rules applicable in non-international armed conflicts according to Common Ar-
ticle 3 GC, as well as Additional Protocol II and customary international law. In addition, unlike 
other fields of international law, humanitarian law is not only concerned with policy decisions 
and their implementation by State organs, but also with acts of the individual, i.e. combatants 
or civilians during wartime. Responsibility is not only incurred by the State itself; the individual 
is also responsible for violations of the laws of war. Thus, reasons for compliance must also be 
explained from the perspective of individuals (3.2.2.) and armed groups (3.2.3.).
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3.2.2 The danger of socializing individuals into violence
Efforts to induce compliance with individuals are confronted with the danger that individuals 
might be more prone to be socialized into violence under the conditions of war-torn areas of 
limited statehood than under traditional warfare. 
Under the premise of the logic of appropriateness, it is somewhat astonishing that substantial 
moral agreement is not sufficient to induce a high rate of compliance with international hu-
manitarian law if actors actually comply with norms because ‘they understand the behaviour to 
be good, desirable, and appropriate’ (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 912). Many of the obligations, in 
particular those concerning protected persons, are so fundamental, and concern such basic hu-
man needs, that most of them can be seen as a manifestation of general moral agreement.20 In 
principle, many rules of international humanitarian law are intuitive, and their content reflects 
efforts to confine the effects of war on civilians and prevent escalation. Accordingly, the funda-
mental rules of international humanitarian law, such as the principle of distinction and non-
combatant immunity, are considered to be ius cogens (Greenwood 2008: 135; Oeter 2008: 447).
Yet such substantial moral agreement alone is apparently insufficient to instil compliance un-
der the particular circumstances of armed conflict. A study conducted by the ICRC, on ‘the 
Roots of Behaviour in War’, explains that group pressure is a major reason an individual soldier 
may not conform to substantial rules by which he or she would abide as a single individual: 
‘The individual may not normally be a killer but the group certainly is. […] The 
combatant is no longer a totally autonomous individual. […] This is a situation 
that favours the dilution of the individual responsibility of the combatant. […] The 
individual within a group has a “natural” tendency to assign a higher value to his 
own group and a lesser one to other groups, […] It has to be emphasized that when 
another group is declared to be an enemy, these tendencies become all the more 
acute. Thus, it is quite easy for the group to slide into criminal behaviour and 
perhaps even to end up promoting and encouraging it.’21 
One consequence of group conformity is the tendency to depersonalize, which in turn pro-
motes the loss of a sense of individual responsibility. These tendencies are aggravated by the 
inclination of combatants to perceive their superiors in the chain of command as those respon-
sible.22 Moreover, a spiral of violence can be observed. If soldiers are victimized, humiliated and 
traumatized during an armed conflict, there is a higher likelihood that they themselves will 
perpetrate violations of the laws of war. A moral disengagement of combatants can also result 
from certain mechanisms to justify violations that they, themselves, have perpetrated. For in-
20  This is particularly true for the rules concerning protected persons, see Krieger (2011); however, for an 
increasing uneasiness with the concept of collateral damage, see: Hankel (2011); Merkel (2012).
21  International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Roots of Behaviour in War – Understanding and Pre-
venting IHL Violations’, Geneva 2004, at 6 et seq.
22  Ibid.
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stance, illegal acts may be considered as legitimate means for certain ends, such as a group’s or 
a State’s survival. Effects might be euphemistically minimized or denied, and such behaviour 
might be coupled with a tendency to dehumanize the enemy.23
 
Conflicts in war-torn areas of limited statehood are characterized by many of the preconditions 
for entering into a spiral of violence. In the context of normalization of war, fighters and sol-
diers are victimized, humiliated and traumatized, often by their own superiors, and socialized 
into war. This development is particularly apparent in the cases of child soldiers.24 The first UN 
Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children stated:
‘The progressive involvement of youth in acts of extreme violence desensitizes them 
to suffering. In a number of cases, young people have been deliberately exposed 
to horrific scenes. Such experience makes children more likely to commit violent 
acts themselves and may contribute to a break with society. In many countries […] 
children have even been forced to commit atrocities against their own families or 
communities.’25
Yet, it is important to keep in mind that forms of socializing individuals into violence equally 
apply to international armed conflicts, such as World War II (Browning 1998), and are by no 
means exclusive to wars in areas of limited Statehood. What are required, in any event, are ef-
forts on the side of the responsible, commanders of armed groups and States’ armed forces 
alike, to prevent or break the spiral of violence. If group pressure and a shift of individual 
responsibility to the command level are typical preconditions for committing war crimes, it is 
evident that egregious violations of the laws of war are in general systematic crimes and only 
occasionally individual ones (Bussmann/Schneider 2012: 4). Consequently, efforts to induce 
compliance with the individual must be initiated by the military and political command level 
and must aim to create a habit and sense of duty within the individual.
In order to overcome an individual’s tendency to enter into a spiral of violence, international 
humanitarian law has traditionally been enforced through a professionalized process of norm 
internalization. The laws of war were traditionally seen as a code of honour for the military 
profession laying down ‘how an honourable soldier would behave in a certain situation’ (Oeter 
1997: 214). This approach corresponds to findings in social science that ‘professional training 
does more than simply transfer technical knowledge; it actively socializes people to value cer-
tain things above others’ (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 905). Adequate military training, integrating 
rules of international humanitarian law, is considered to be essential for creating respect for the 
23  Ibid., at 8 et seq.
24  Despite modern discourses on child agency and child soldiers joining armed groups voluntarily, the 
effects of victimization, humiliation and traumatization, which also apply to adults, should not be 
overlooked; for a particularly skeptical view of the dominant perception of child soldiers as victims, 
see: Drumble (2012: 12 et seqq).
25  Report of the expert of the Secretary-General ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’ (26 August 1996) 
UN Doc. A/51/306, para. 48.
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law because iterated behaviour and habit consolidate norms among the members of a profes-
sion (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 904; Morrow 2007: 571). Accordingly, Article 83(1) AP I stipulates 
an obligation of the State parties ‘to include the study of [international humanitarian law] in 
their programmes of military instruction’. The importance of adequate dissemination of inter-
national humanitarian law and training of soldiers has been confirmed by UNSC Resolution 
1894 of 11 November 2009.26
While there are certain attempts among armed groups to rely on norm internalization, such as 
in the case of the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ), which made its members swear 
an oath on the Quran including the pledge to refrain from harming civilians (Bangerter forth-
coming), empirical findings show that only a minority of individuals living in areas of armed 
conflict know about the rules of international humanitarian law (Sivakumaran 2012: 434). If 
there is no room for professional training in order to create a habit of norm-compliance, the 
logic of consequences, particularly the fear of sanctions, may induce individual soldiers and 
fighters to comply.
Based on its experience, seen in practice as well as in empirical research, the ICRC emphasizes 
the importance of the fear of sanctions as an instrument for inducing compliance of the indi-
vidual soldier. The ICRC starts from the assumption that 
‘the behaviour of combatants is determined mainly by three parameters: (1) their 
position within a group, which leads them to behave in conformity with what the 
group expects of them, (2) their position in a hierarchical structure, which leads 
them to obey authority (because they perceive it as legitimate or it acts on them as 
a coercive force, or a mixture of the two), (3) the process of moral disengagement 
favoured by the war situation, which authorizes recourse to violence against those 
defined as being the enemy.’27 
Under these conditions, a spiral of violence can only be interrupted if group behaviour is con-
trolled by superiors through strict orders accompanied by a realistic threat of swift and immedi-
ate sanctions. Only such swift and immediate sanctions can stop a constant increase in violence, 
because otherwise violations become continuously more severe and more acceptable.28 In order 
to instigate a fear of sanctions, these instruments need to be imposed coherently. Individual 
26  The UN Security Council “calls upon all parties concerned, (a) to ensure the widest possible dissemi-
nation of information about international humanitarian […] law [, and] (b) to provide training for pub-
lic officials, members of armed forces and armed groups, personnel associated to armed forces, civilian 
police and law enforcement personnel, and members of the judicial and legal professions; and to raise 
awareness among civil society and the civilian population on relevant international humanitarian […] 
law, as well as on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict 
situations, to achieve full and effective compliance; for a corresponding obligation under customary 
international law see Rule 142 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL).
27  International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Roots of Behaviour in War’, above note 21, at 15.
28  Ibid., at 16
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combatants would otherwise not be stopped from committing violations of international hu-
manitarian law, as they would assume that they are highly unlikely to be punished. The threat 
of punishment must be a realistic one.29 Since war crimes are, in general, systematic crimes in 
that the command level fails to prevent or even incites soldiers to customize to violence,30 there 
appears to be a stronger pull for leaders at the command level to socialize individuals into vio-
lence than into norm compliance in war-torn areas of limited statehood.
3.2.3 No more compliance-pull for warlords?
Some authors explain this pull not to comply on the basis of the ‘new wars’ theory (proponents 
of this theory include: Kaldor 2006; Münkler 2005). These authors hold that international hu-
manitarian law can no longer direct actors’ behaviour in conflicts in war-torn areas of limited 
statehood. They argue that the parties’ interest is, per se, incompatible with the law because 
they pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing and economic exploitation. It is held that actors would 
neither care for considerations of reciprocity, nor reputation or fear of sanctions.31 Under such 
conditions, it would indeed be hard to conceive how the logic of consequence could be applied, 
 at all. However, such an approach partly works on the underlying assumption that violent 
non-state actors, such as warlords, would not be rational actors whose behaviour could not be 
affected by strategic considerations. 
This interpretation neglects to acknowledge that the use and non-use of force may still be in-
strumental, and that armed groups pursue coherent strategies and demands which are at least 
partly based on political motivations.32 Violence against civilians is rarely an aim in itself, but 
rather regularly an instrument for attaining a different goal (Bussmann/Schneider 2012: 15). 
Voices from practice argue that random violence hardly ever occurs, but that even the most 
shocking atrocities are politically motivated, sometimes with the aim of gaining the attention 
of the international community (Bangerter forthcoming). There is strong empirical evidence 
to suggest that political aspirations and strategic considerations are decisive, even if observers 
tend to classify conflicts as mere irrational ‘warlordism’.33  The ICRC emphasised in its empiri-
cal report, ‘The Roots of Behaviour in War’, that ‘violations of international humanitarian law 
are not generally the work of sick, sadistic or irrational individuals’.34 Accordingly, Reed Wood 
criticizes assumptions based on the ‘new wars’ theory from the perspective of political science; 
empirically, it is difficult to prove that genocide has replaced military victory as a political aim, 
since there appears to be no clear relation between ethnic conflicts and the number of civilian 
victims of any type of conflict (Wood forthcoming; Wood 2010: 601). The ‘new wars’ theory can-
29  Official Working Document of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
‘International Humanitarian Law’, above note 10, at 32.
30  International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Roots of Behaviour in War’, above note 21, at 8.
31  Lamp (2011: 242 et seqq.); Geiss (2006: 770, 773); Bassouni (2008: 765 et seqq.) ; Sassóli (2007: 49).
32  The genuinely political approach of armed groups is emphasized by Bassouni, (2008: 767).
33  On the danger that international criminal courts and western perceptions of armed conflicts on the 
African continent construct stereotypes, see Cryer (forthcoming).
34  International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Roots of Behaviour in War’, above note 21, at 8.
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not explain variations in violence across conflicts and over time. Thus, it does not sufficiently 
take into account the dynamics of conflict and overemphasizes its static elements (Wood forth-
coming). In an empirical study, Reed Wood illustrates that even the Uganda Lord Resistance 
Army (LRA), which is known for its particularly heinous violence towards civilians, changed its 
strategy over time. He proves that incentives for increasing violence against civilians are a lack 
of resources, military capabilities and civilian support. Armed groups turn to violence in order 
to compensate for a loss of resources. In war-torn areas of limited statehood, rebels and war-
lords aim to affect civilian activities and use violence against civilians in order to avoid military 
defeat (Wood forthcoming; Bussmann/Schneider 2012: at 18 et seq.).
Moreover, empirical research on governance insurgency and compliance with international 
law demonstrates that armed groups tend to provide governance structures, including security, 
if they have established effective and centralized control of a territory with unified command 
structures (Mampilly 2011; Wood forthcoming). Thus, armed groups, such as the RCD in Congo, 
the UCS-faction in Somalia or SPLM/A in Sudan, have granted the ICRC access.35 Correspond-
ingly, Mampilly illustrates that, among the 40 warring factions in the DRC, many of the organi-
zations have attempted to establish governance structures. Their failure to do so is not based on 
a disinterest in civilian protection, but rather stems from organizational reasons, among others. 
Even the RCD, which is generally regarded as a typical example of  warlordism, attempted to 
provide for civilian welfare (Mampilly forthcoming). There is a presumption that traditional 
incentives for compliance still matter but need to be adjusted to the particular situations of 
conflicts in war-torn areas of limited statehood.
3.3 The remainders of traditional incentives: Self-interest and expectations of reciprocal 
behaviour 
In social science, realism and the rational choice theory have drawn attention to the interests 
of the relevant actors as a major reason for compliance. Essentially, realism36 disputes the idea 
that that the legal nature of an international obligation is of any significance for compliance. Its 
most rigorous proponents suggest that international law does not, in and of itself, influence an 
actor’s behaviour at all, if vital (national) interests are concerned (Mearsheimer 1995: 9 et seqq.; 
Boyle 1980: 198). Traditional realists focussing on the State hold that the anarchic character of 
the international system prompts States to protect their vital interests and to strive for power 
and security (Grieco 1988: 488). From this point of view, compliance with international law will 
only take place if it reflects a State’s self-interest, not because of its character as a normative 
commitment (Morgenthau 1940: 277). Since interests are uncertain in the realm of high politics, 
for instance in national security, ‘the validity of the rules depends upon a balance of power’ 
35  Jo/Bryant (2013: 244). However, granting access can have reverse effects insofar as reports of human 
rights violations can be unfavorable to their international reputation. The RCD, for instance, tried to 
restrict access to certain areas or used violence in rural areas which were not under local or interna-
tional observation, see Mampilly (forthcoming).
36  The most prominent works include: Morgenthau (1948); Morgenthau (1940); Kennan (1951); Carr (1964).
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which will be subject to constant changes (Morgenthau 1940: 278 et seq.). A more recent variant 
of realism is reflected in the instrumentalist and the rational choice strand,37 which also start 
from a concept of interests and submits that international law will only be relevant if it has an 
effect on an actor’s calculation of interests. Accordingly, non-compliance is an option, if it ap-
pears to be more rational to further short-term self-interest, while others obey the law (Keohane 
2002: 119).
International law has long acknowledged that self-interest is a major compliance-pull in a 
decentralized legal system by building international treaties on reciprocity (Simma 1972). As 
long as international law lacks centralized enforcement mechanisms, reciprocity, as a particular 
form of self-interest, is a major instrument to stabilize international relations (Simma 2008: 
para. 1). However, as a legal concept, reciprocity must not be confused with social aspects of 
reciprocity where motivations to comply are based on an expectation of in-kind responses. As 
a principle of international law, reciprocity refers to ‘the maxim that a State basing a claim on a 
particular norm of international law must accept that rule as also binding upon itself [so that] 
a certain conduct by one party is […] judicially dependent upon that of the other party’ (Simma 
2008: para. 2). While this understanding holds true for general international law,38 international 
humanitarian law builds on the aspect of social expectations in terms of expectations of recip-
rocated behaviour, since ‘the obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conven-
tions does not depend on [legal] reciprocity’.39 Therefore, international humanitarian law relies 
on the actor’s motives insofar as its enforcement presupposes that no party to a conflict can 
expect the adversary to respect the legal limitations of warfare if the party itself violates those 
rules.40 
Empirical research in social science suggests that, in international armed conflicts, reciprocal 
expectations are the major reason for compliance for the State as well as for the individual sol-
dier (Morrow 2007: 561 et seqq). Accordingly, the German Military Manual states: ‘Soldiers must 
treat their opponents in the same manner that they themselves wish to be treated’.41 Recipro-
cal expectations are particularly significant because they can instil compliance in the combat 
theatre itself (Geiss 2006: 760). Unlike other instruments of compliance, fear of retaliation does 
not work ex post, but in the heat of an on-going armed conflict (Dinstein 2010: 254). In the 
words of Dinstein: ‘Many norms […] (usually accepted in peacetime, when the exigencies of war 
37  Major works include: Goldsmith/Posner (2005); Posner (2003: 1917).
38  Reciprocity as a legal concept is particularly important in relation to ius ad bellum, law of diplomatic 
privileges and immunities, international economic relations and the treatment of aliens, see Simma 
(2008: para. 8 et seq).
39  Rule 140 CIHL: Netherlands, Special Court of Cassation, In re Rauter, Judgment of 12 January
 1949 (1955) Annual Digest 16, 526 § 202; United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, United States of 
America v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (Case No. 12 – the High Command Trial), Judgment of 27 October 1948, 
9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1, 481; see however, Art. 2 Hague 
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907); see in generalde Preux (1985: 
25 et seqq); Provost (2002: 136 et seqq.).
40  Wolfrum/Fleck (2008: 1402, 1404); Oeter (1997: 214); Sivakumaran (2012: 245).
41  Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Handbuch, 
ZDv 15/2 (1992), no. 1204.
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do not loom on the horizon) may prove too onerous once put to test. [...] If belligerent Parties 
refrain from contravening them, notwithstanding a perception that these norms tie their hands 
too strenuously, it is largely due to the knowledge that any deviation is likely to entail painful 
retaliation’ (Dinstein 2010: 254). Consequently, belligerent reprisals are considered to be a very 
important means of enforcing international humanitarian law.42
The empirical argument that expectations of reciprocal behaviour are decisive for compliance 
by the individual soldier is based on the observation that compliance is worst where treatment 
of civilians is concerned; the record of compliance improves where there is a direct threat of 
retaliation for soldiers, for instance in cases of treatment of prisoners of war. While every sol-
dier is, in principle, capable of committing atrocities against civilians, civilians will, in most 
cases, not be able to attack soldiers (Morrow 2007: 567 et seqq). This demonstrates that recipro-
cal expectations have a ‘Janus-face’ (Simma 2008: para. 16),  since fear of individual retaliations 
will only direct the soldier’s behaviour if there is a certain prospect that the enemy soldier will 
actually fight back and violate the laws of war in response to an infringement. Since individual 
soldiers are not entitled to undertake belligerent reprisals,43 reciprocal expectations on the level 
of the individual only appear to induce compliance if individuals are prepared to infringe the 
laws of war regardless of their legal obligations. 
The ‘Janus-face’ character of reciprocal expectations as a means for inducing compliance is also 
present at the State level. While fear of retaliation is the major argument for the permissibility 
of belligerent reprisals as an instrument for enforcing international humanitarian law, the dan-
ger of abuse and escalation inherent in the concept of unilateral counter-measures has trig-
gered a wide-ranging prohibition of reprisals against specific categories of protected persons 
and objects (Bothe 2008: para. 67). While expectations of reciprocal behaviour may thus further 
compliance, they may simultaneously endanger the stability of the international order (Geiss 
2006: 771; Simma 2008: para 16).
When considering armed groups in war-torn areas of limited statehood, some authors have 
doubted that reciprocal expectations and self-interest have any role to play in inducing com-
pliance with international humanitarian law (Lamp 2011: 248 et seq.; Pfanner 2005: 161). Inter-
national humanitarian law (no longer) appears to be in and of itself entirely beneficial for all 
relevant actors, due to a lack of strict legal reciprocity and asymmetries in regard to reciprocal 
expectations (Geiss 2006: 776). Such expectations presuppose parallel interest of the conflicting 
parties. Research in social sciences has stressed that self-interest as a content-dependent com-
pliance motive requires that the rules are more or less in every actor’s self-interest (Schmelzle 
2011: 11). Such a common ground appears to be unlikely in non-international armed conflicts 
(Geiss 2006: 760; Pfanner 2005: 161). Moreover, according to this argument, international hu-
manitarian law no longer corresponds to other self-interests of the conflicting parties because 
42  US, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Edition July 2007, 6.2.4.: belligerent re-
prisals constitute ‘an act that would otherwise be unlawful but which is justified as a response to the 
previous unlawful acts of an enemy’.
43  The decision to use reprisals must be authorized by the highest political level, Oeter (2008: 477).
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military victory no longer appears to be the parties’ primary interest in war-torn areas of lim-
ited statehood (Lamp 2011: 234, 243). Since international humanitarian law is built on the com-
promise between military necessity and humanitarian considerations, the balance will dissolve 
if overcoming the enemy is no longer the parties’ main goal (Lamp 2011: 243).
However, a closer look at practical experience and empirical research demonstrates that 
reciprocal expectations and self-interest still matter as a motive for compliance in war-torn 
areas of limited statehood. While economic exploitation and ethnic motivations play a consid-
erable role in such conflicts, one must bear in mind that self-interest in particular is context-
dependent as a motive for compliance. Accordingly, in its 2007 report on international hu-
manitarian law and the ‘Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, the ICRC stressed that 
any attempt to induce compliance must start from a strategic approach and must consider ‘the 
unique characteristics of a specific situation [and] understand a party’s motivations and interests 
in order to explain why it is in the party’s interest to comply with the law’.44 In war-torn areas 
of limited statehood there is a great diversity of parties. Consequently, conflict structures vary 
considerably, as do motives.45 There are examples from the conflict in Chad where expectation 
of reciprocal behaviour also affected the decisions of armed groups. Fighters were given orders 
not to harm civilians because rebels feared retaliation by families and clans (Bangerter forth-
coming). This example reflects that many of the conflicts in war-torn areas of limited statehood 
are in fact symmetrically fought between various armed groups; hence, expectations of de facto 
reciprocity still matter. Accordingly, in his 2009 report on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, the UN Secretary General argued that ‘the incentives for armed groups to comply with 
the law should be emphasized, including increased likelihood of reciprocal respect for the law 
by opposing parties’.46
From a normative perspective, the law of non-international armed conflict was created with the 
awareness that reciprocal expectations are more limited in this field (Geiss 2006: 760). Accord-
ingly, the high threshold of applicability in Additional Protocol II also tries to guarantee some 
conditions for reciprocal expectations (Geiss 2006: 777). Only armed groups which are similar 
to a State are bound by the Protocol’s obligations. Thereby the Protocol creates a certain sym-
metry within the regime of non-international armed conflict. Moreover, it is conceivable that 
armed groups have certain interests in common with States’ armed forces. Rules on prisoners 
and wounded and sick soldiers spring to mind (Geiss 2006: 760; Bangerter 2011: 366). Although 
the law of non-international armed conflict does not provide for an adequate prisoner of war 
regime, in the past, armed groups have issued commitments to apply the Geneva Convention 
III (Sivakumaran 2011: 479). Efforts to ban landmines are another area where States and armed 
groups have common interests. Both actors are affected by their indiscriminate effects and 
therefore both have an interest in their removal or non-use. (Schneckener/Hofmann forthcom-
44  Official Working Document of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
‘International Humanitarian Law’, above note 10, at 49.
45  Ibid., at 46 et seq.
46  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 41.
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ing). In some cases, accession of armed groups to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for Ad-
herence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action47 prompted 
the territorial State to accede to the 1997 Ottawa Treaty (Schneckener/Hofmann forthcoming). 
Moreover, other forms of self-interest might also have a bearing on compliance by armed 
groups and States’ armed forces alike. Certain norms foster a greater interest in international 
co-operation than others. Schneckener and Hofmann have shown that norms with a techni-
cal dimension, such as a ban of landmines, evoke several aspects of self-interest from armed 
groups. Since removal of landmines requires a certain technical know-how, the willingness to 
co-operate internationally increases (Schneckener/Hofmann forthcoming). Military efficiency 
as a self-interest is also involved when norm entrepreneurs can raise the argument that compli-
ant behaviour will have a positive impact on the efficiency, discipline and internal functioning 
of an armed group (Ratner 2011: 478). Economic interests are in general a major self-interest 
that influences the behaviour of non-state actors. The ICRC is reported to use economic argu-
ments underpinning the prospect that compliant behaviour might result in (additional) foreign 
economic support for the armed group or for a State (Ratner 2011: 478; Jo/Bryant 2013: 242; 
Mampilly forthcoming). Thus, it would be premature and hasty to negate that self-interest and 
reciprocity do not have a role to play in inducing compliance in war-torn areas of limited state-
hood.
3.4 Fostering an armed group’s interest in international reputation as an enduring 
dilemma 
Interest in international and national reputation represents a particular form of self-interest. 
Rational choice theory and constructivism alike have drawn attention to rewards as another 
motive for compliance. Guzman has based his state-centred rational choice approach to inter-
national law on reputation as the major factor for a compliance pull of international law. He 
submits that self-interest is decisive for a State’s compliance decision, but international law 
influences this decision, on the one hand because of fear of sanctions, and on the other hand 
because non-compliance may result in a loss of reputation (Guzman 2002: 1825; Guzman 2006: 
386 et seq.). He holds that this impact will not always be strong enough to change the State’s 
behaviour. According to Guzman, the impact depends, inter alia, on the identities of the States 
involved (Guzman 2002: 1825; Delcourt 2008: para. 11). Also, from the perspective of construc-
tivism, reputation plays a major role as a reason for compliance. Finnemore and Sikkink have 
argued that it is the State’s identity in relation to the international community that renders repu- 
tation a decisive incentive for compliance. ‘We argue that […] state leaders conform to norms in 
order to avoid the disapproval aroused by norm violation and thus to enhance national esteem 
(and, as a result, their own self- esteem)’ (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 903 et seq.). Not only do the 
costs incurred by being labelled a ‘rogue state’ trigger States’ compliance, but also the fact that 
47  For a text of the Deed, see http://www.genevacall.org/resources/deed-of-commitment/f-deed-of-com-
mitment/doc.pdf.
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international reputation ‘has become an essential contributor to perceptions of domestic le-
gitimacy held by a state’s own citizens […] international legitimation is important insofar as it 
reflects back on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately 
on its ability to stay in power’ (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 902 et seq.). 
Accordingly, considerations for public opinion are considered to be essential motives for a 
State’s compliance with international humanitarian law, especially in view of the prominent 
role of mass media in armed conflicts. Public knowledge of gross violations may spoil the 
fighting moral, as well as the consent of the State’s population (Wolfrum/Fleck 2008: 1402 et 
seq.). However, this argument relies very much on the constructivist explanation that domestic 
legitimacy might depend on a State’s international reputation and the States’ perspective that 
international reputation is an asset at all. It is closely related to liberalism and democratic States 
(Delcourt 2008: para. 14). Consequently, Lamp has submitted that public opinion and reputa-
tion have no role to play in the ‘new wars’. Since the killing of civilians appears to become ac-
ceptable where ethnic conflicts are conducted, armed groups in such circumstances ‘usually do 
not have to fear that publicity for their actions would lose them support in their own popula-
tions. In some endemic conflicts in which perpetual warfare constitutes a form of life for the 
participants—the Hutu militias in Eastern Congo and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Northern Uganda are examples—it is hard to imagine how public opinion could have any effect 
on the warring parties’ actions’ (Lamp 2011: 246 et seq.). 
Nonetheless, one must also be aware that, in terms of reputation as a motive for compliance, 
armed groups vary considerably. While some groups operate as political actors pursuing long-
term political goals, others may lack such goals, as well as any coherent and stable structure 
(Jo/Bryant 2013: 242; Mampilly forthcoming). Reputation will work as a motive for compliance 
only if an armed group cares about civilian support and relies on core constituents. Interest in 
reputation also depends on its military capability; the stronger the group, the more it will be 
interested in political aims, since it will appear to be a realistic scenario that the group might 
replace the government. In such a case, national and international reputation becomes impor-
tant for political survival. The groups’ awareness of these mechanisms might depend on the 
existence of a political wing (Jo/Bryant 2013: 245; Mampilly forthcoming). Irrespective of the 
variations in armed groups, all these groups have to address the question of how to relate to the 
civilian population. Controlling and winning over the local population is a way to demonstrate 
the strength of an armed group, while a failure to do so might cause their control to be chal-
lenged. ‘In order to ensure their viability, insurgencies cannot rely solely on coercive means, 
but must also gain a degree of consent from the civilian population’ (Mampilly forthcoming). 
Moreover, armed groups can promote their legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population 
in their territory by improving the populations’ living conditions, which in turn will affect the 
political stability of the group’s control (Mampilly forthcoming). In addition, the practice of the 
ICRC is partly built on the assumption that the ‘target’s domestic or international reputation’ 
still matters (Ratner 2011: 478; Schneckener/Hofmann forthcoming). Thus, the ICRC has expe-
rienced that only very exceptionally armed groups are unwilling to engage with humanitarian 
organizations at all (Bangerter forthcoming). Some of the measures of the UN Security Council, 
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such as the so-called ‘List of Shame’, also rely on the assumption that reputation matters for 
armed groups (Bangerter forthcoming). The UN Secretary-General has repeatedly stated that 
factors inducing compliance ‘include the need for popular support and the group’s self-image 
and self-interest’.48 Thus, reputation at the local level, as well as on the international level, re-
mains a powerful motive for compliance.
Consequently, empirical research unfolds a severe dilemma: the likelihood that armed groups 
will comply with norms of international humanitarian law increases as the a group grows stron-
ger. By contrast, if a group is weakened, it will most likely increase its levels of violence against 
civilians. As a hypothetical consequence one option might be to stabilize rebel groups. The 
more stable and effective an armed group becomes, and the more it complies with international 
law and negotiates with international public and private actors, the more it gains in terms of 
legitimacy. Of course, it is highly unlikely that States or international organizations would di-
rectly pursue such an approach. The States’ unwillingness to engage with armed groups is not 
only a matter of vested interests, but also of law. It is primarily the prohibition of intervention 
into the internal affairs of a State that restricts corresponding efforts. Some forms of material 
assistance might amount to subversive intervention, thereby violating the principle of non-
intervention (Kunig 2008: para. 24). Since training, for instance, is in principle forbidden,49 sup-
porting armed groups in teaching international humanitarian law during training might be 
considered illegal too. In  situation, the classification will depend on the evaluation of whether 
a particular form of promoting international humanitarian law compliance amounts to hu-
manitarian help, which is in principle permissible, or not (Kunig 2008: para. 35). Moreover, 
while support of a people exercising its right to self-determination would be privileged (UNGA 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 14 December 1974), contemporary conflicts do not fall under this cat-
egory since the decolonization process has come to an end. Many of the present day conflicts 
are therefore categorized as terrorism and thus criminalized. Armed groups such as the Liber-
ation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were or are still included on lists of terrorists. In other cases 
where armed groups are striving for independence, such as in Somaliland or South Sudan, 
self-determination could not be invoked for privileging support of the armed groups involved. 
The restrictive traditional interpretation of self-determination and secession also draws legal 
limits for States  who wish to promote a rebel group’s stability for the sake of compliance with 
international humanitarian law. 
Nonetheless, some States acknowledge more and more a need for directly engaging with armed 
groups, as long as “engagement does not constitute political recognition of these groups”.50 
Similarly, the UN Secretary-General has accepted the need for directly engaging with armed 
groups and has ‘emphasized repeatedly the need for consistent engagement with those groups 
48  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 
42.
49  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] 
ICJ Reports 168, paras. 161 et seqq.
50  UNSC, 6790th meeting (25 June 2012) UN Doc. S/PV 6790, Statement of the Representative of Germany, 
p. 23.
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to seek improved compliance’.51 However, there are still reasons to assume that such a develop-
ment contradicts basic interests of State actors in general, and of the governments concerned 
in particular.52 This approach is, for instance, reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2078 
(2012), in which the council ‘condemns the attempts by the M23 to establish an illegitimate par-
allel administration and to undermine State authority of the Government of the DRC’ (UNSC 
Resolution 2078 (28 November 2012) para. 6). States’ scepticism about engaging armed groups 
is repeatedly revealed by the UN Security Council’s discussion on Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflicts. For instance, in 2012, Colombia —- a state currently fighting armed groups 
in its territory — fiercely rejected the suggestion of the UN Secretary-General to engage more 
actively with armed groups:
‘Nevertheless, the existence or absence of engagement on the part of the United 
Nations with these groups is not a decisive factor in the application of the rules 
governing armed conflicts. Focusing on the possibility of engagements of certain 
actors with illegal armed groups simply diverts attention from the truly fundamental 
issue — the lack of political will to comply with international humanitarian law. 
An effective guarantee of the rights of civilians during hostilities does not require 
engagement with non-State groups, but rather the decision on the part of those 
parties, either to abandon altogether the use of violence and pursue their goals 
through democratic debate, or, if they decide to persist in their armed struggle, to 
comply with international humanitarian law.’53
Moreover, Colombia has criticized the idea that ‘there should be ongoing and direct engage-
ment between non-State armed groups and the relevant United Nations bodies’.54 The dilemma 
was explicitly named by the UN Secretary-General when he stated that ‘focus on recognition 
and legitimacy is problematic in that it detracts from the more serious issue of the consequen-
ces for civilians when engagement does not take place’.55
3.5 Improving armed groups’ perceptions of the law’s legitimacy 
The same dilemma develops out of the perspective of the logic of appropriateness and consid-
erations of legitimacy. From the point of view of an armed group’s command level, the logic 
of appropriateness might not exert a sufficiently strong compliance-pull, since the group per-
ceives international humanitarian law as not sufficiently legitimate. Such an empirical legiti-
51  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 
41.
52  Ibid., paras. 44 et seq.
53  UNSC, 6790th meeting (25 June 2012) UN Doc. S/PV 6790, Statement of the Representative of Colum-
bia, p. 12.
54  Ibid., at pp. 12 et seqq. 
55  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 
45.
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macy, which describes the ‘beliefs and attitudes of the affected actors regarding the normative 
status of a rule, government, political system or governance regime’,56 is an important element 
of inducing compliance, since compliance as a law-abiding behaviour will often be based on 
an actor’s perception that the rule has a high normative value. Research on governance in areas 
of limited statehood has identified various resources for the empirical legitimacy as a neces-
sary prerequisite for the effectiveness, i.e. compliance-pull of (normative) orders: effectiveness 
as output-legitimacy, the adaptability of norms, i.e. the capability of international norms to be 
translated into the specific contexts of areas of limited statehood, participation of addressees 
and procedural fairness (input- and throughput-legitimacy), as well as the authority of the norm 
entrepreneurs.57 From a legal perspective, the latter two criteria are particularly significant, since 
they concern the process of norm-creation. Accordingly, they have also been highlighted in 
international legal theory. Thomas Franck, for instance, has identified some comparable pre-
conditions for a compliance-pull of international norms. Franck starts from the assumption 
that the legitimacy of an international norm depends on the norm addressees’ belief that it has 
‘come into being in accordance with the right process’ (Franck 1995: 24; Franck 1988: 706). As 
elements of the right process, Thomas Franck identifies, inter alia, symbolic validation. Accord-
ingly, the legitimacy of an international rule also depends on its ability to communicate author-
ity, i.e. ‘the authority of a rule, the authority of the originator of a validating communication 
and, at times, the authority bestowed on the recipient of the communication’ (Franck 1988: 725; 
Franck 1990: 91 et seq. with reference to Schachter 1968: 309-311). He holds that a new rule will 
have a greater compliance-pull if it is introduced ‘under the aegis of a particularly venerable 
sponsor’ (Franck 1988: 727). Both aspects – procedural fairness and authority of the norm en-
trepreneur – advocate a greater participation of non-state actors in inducing compliance with 
international humanitarian law.
From the perspective of armed groups, legitimacy is particularly deficient in terms of proce-
dural fairness; armed groups must comply with rules whose creation they never consented to.58 
It is a result of a gradual development of international humanitarian law that this lack of parti-
cipation is increasingly seen as deficient. Traditionally, under Article 38 of the ICJ-Statute, it 
is only States that can create law under the three sources of international law: treaties, custom 
and general principles. This corresponds to their traditional status as original subjects of inter-
national law who can only be limited in their capacities upon their consent. From this perspec-
tive, armed groups, as much as individuals, were traditionally only seen as objects of the law. 
However, contemporary international law has broadened the categories of its subjects to now 
include international organizations as well as individuals. Correspondingly, the law of non- 
international armed conflicts confers the status of subjects of international law on armed 
56  Schmelzle (2011: 7); Cassese (2012: 429), who in principle also distinguishes between empirical and 
normative legitimacy. Sometimes empirical legitimacy is also described as perceived legitimacy, Ford 
(2012: 407 et seq.).
57  Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des 
Regierens? Finanzierungsantrag 2014 - 2015 - 2016 - 2017, Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin 2013.
58  Lamp (2011: 241); Sivakumaran (forthcoming) utilizes the example of the Viet Cong, which explicitly 
stated 1965 that it is not bound by the Geneva Convention since it did not participate in norm creation 
process.
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groups. Yet, while international organizations are entitled to conclude treaties under inter-
national law in the sphere of their competences, armed groups still do not participate in the 
creation of the law applied to them (Roberts/Sivakumaran 2012: 111 et seqq.). However, the 
underlying idea of procedural legitimacy is that ownership of the norms is created (Sassóli 
2007: 64; Sassóli 2010: 6, 20 et seq.), insofar as ‘involvement in a process can lead to support for 
the results of that process’ (Sivakumaran forthcoming). There are numerous suggestions on 
how to create ownership despite the limits of traditional international law. The approaches in-
clude considering the practice of armed groups and their opinio juris in the process of creating 
customary international law, inviting such groups to participate in treaty-making processes or 
bestowing ad hoc commitments and unilateral declarations by armed groups with legal force in 
the context of a particular conflict (Sassóli 2010: 21 et seq.; Sivakumaran forthcoming).
Without evaluating the validity of these different proposals, what remains clear is that such 
efforts are more easily promoted by non-state actors. They enjoy a high standing as norm 
entrepreneurs because organizations such as Geneva Call, or a neutral organization such as the 
ICRC, can act more independently from States’ self-interests than UN organs (Sassóli 2010: 23; 
Zaum 2009: 27). They are not subject to certain (legal) limitations of the international order. 
Again, empirical research supports these findings. Jo and Bryant have shown on the basis of 
a case study from Sudan that political interaction among non-state actors – rebel groups and 
international humanitarian organizations – furthers compliance with international humani-
tarian law, and that, correspondingly, the most successful of the Sudanese rebel groups, the 
SPLA/M, followed a strategy of engaging with civil society as a means to attain status at the 
international level (Jo/Bryant 2013: 258). Here, symbolic validation is important. Both Geneva 
Call and the ICRC can claim considerable standing as norm entrepreneurs, which adds to the 
empirical legitimacy of the norms they are promoting (see, in general, Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 
906). Both institutions can rely on the so-called ‘Swiss-factor’ as actors coming from an inter-
nationally highly respected country’ (Schneckener/Hofmann forthcoming). 
The ‘Swiss factor’ adds to the general perception that these institutions are neutral and im-
partial actors and lack a ‘State-bias’. At the same time, both can also rely on the expertise and 
standing of their personnel.59 The often technical dimension of their advice, for instance in the 
case of landmines, adds to their perception as neutral institutions (Zaum 2009: 29). Empirical 
research proves that such ‘approaches to engaging armed actors are often viewed as being more 
sincere and dedicated to a sustainable resolution of the conflict based on the demands and 
preferences of the parties to conflict rather than being interested in the maintenance of the sta-
tus quo’ (Schneckener/Hofmann forthcoming). Unlike (powerful) State actors, they are unable to 
exert pressure to influence the behaviour of the parties to the conflict. Thus, the norm diffusion 
process appears to be (more) genuine and does not depend on pressure scenarios (Schneck-
ener/Hofmann forthcoming). Accordingly, NGOs have become an essential part in the overall 
pattern of inducing compliance with international humanitarian law.
59  Schneckener/Hofmann (forthcoming); for the International Committee of the Red Cross: Ratner 
(2011: 491).
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4. Turning to non-state actors as norm entrepreneurs inducing compliance
Empirical research has prompted a turn to non-state actors as norm entrepreneurs. For in-
ducing compliance, diverging instruments60 may be combined by different actors in order to 
overcome, at least to a certain extent, the limitations that State interests pose. Hierarchical coer-
cive mechanisms by State-empowered international organisations might accommodate certain 
State interests while effectively ameliorating compliance using instruments of law enforcement 
(4.1.). Where State interests impede effective action, the responsibility of inducing compliance 
may be handed over to private non-state actors that act on the basis of non-hierarchical instru-
ments such as persuasion and rewards (4.2.).
4.1 Coercion:  Extending the responsibility of the international community
Coercion can be defined as a hierarchical instrument to direct an actor’s behaviour by leaving 
the actor no alternative but to comply with the norms. Thus, coercion is directly linked to law 
enforcement.61 Law enforcement does not only build on actual coercion, but also on the threat 
of sanctions as well. This is particularly apparent in international criminal law that relies, not 
only on special, but also on general deterrence, each with a positive and a negative component 
(Cryer et al. 2007: 20). The punishment of the offenders is not only directed at stopping them 
from committing a specific crime, but also from repeating criminal behaviour in the future. In 
addition, the threat of sanctions is also supposed to work as an incentive for others to remain 
law-abiding (Cryer forthcoming). In law enforcement, the effectiveness of these sanctions relies 
heavily on the real threat of coercion, which a legal system with effective hierarchical instru-
ments can exert. 
Coercion as a means to enforce international humanitarian law is increasingly exercised by 
international institutions such as the ICC and the UN Security Council. These institutions have 
taken over responsibilities which traditionally lie with the State. In particular, experiences with 
conflicts in war-torn areas of limited statehood have pushed and prompted the creation of in-
struments that subsidiarily assume the responsibilities of States unable or unwilling to exercise 
them. This compensatory function of international organs is particularly evident in the case of 
the International Criminal Court.
4.1.1 Waning legitimacy of international criminal justice?
According to Article 17 para. 3 of the ICC-Statute, the ICC can intervene to replace the national 
judiciary if national judicial systems are ineffective (Burke-White 2005: 575). However, efforts 
of the international community to take over a residuary responsibility by providing for inter-
60 Social sciences have identified four social mechanisms for inducing compliance: coercion, incentive 
structures, persuasion and capacity-building; see: Risse/Börzel  (2012: 3 et seq).
61  Ibid.
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national criminal justice will only work if these efforts are seen as legitimate by the communi-
ties affected. 
What is needed is the creation of empirical legitimacy. Here, the criterion of adaptability of an 
institution to the context of local communities becomes important.62 Efforts by international 
actors require clear strategies on how to communicate their activities to local communities. 
Otherwise, the actor’s work may be undermined by processes of rejection.63 Criteria for cre-
ating such empirical legitimacy include the court’s location, the composition of the staff and 
the court’s outreach efforts (Ford 2012: 412; Stromseth 2007: 268). A particularly important cri-
terion concerns the question of whom the court prosecutes, as decisions on prosecution might 
conflict with ‘a group’s dominant internal narrative about responsibility for the conflict’ (Ford 
2012: 410). By perceiving the Court as biased, members of a group are able to maintain their own 
interpretation of the conflict (Ford 2012: 410). The latter phenomenon appears to be part of the 
ICC’s legitimacy problem in the DRC. Courts can counteract such perception if they are able to 
bring the ‘internal narratives’ in line with a more objective perception of the conflict in the long 
run (Ford 2012: 411). The process of rejection might also be fostered if the court’s activities are 
seen as biased and selective – a perception which affects the procedural fairness.64 
There is a widespread perception in Africa that the ICC applies double standards in decisions 
concerning indictment and prosecution (du Plessis/Louw/Maunganidze 2012: 2 et seq.). Indeed, 
as of 2012, all situations pending before the Court still concern African conflicts. Thus, in the 
DRC there appears to be a widespread negative perception of the ICC within the local com-
munities. A majority of citizens in eastern DRC seem to prefer national over international pro-
secution (Kumbu forthcoming; Cassese 2012: 500), notwithstanding the severe shortcomings of 
the national judicial system. In this context, empirical research demonstrates that, in contrast 
with traditional perception of public international law,65 consent of the State concerned is not 
sufficient to create empirical legitimacy (Ford 2012: 408; Stromseth 2007: 260, 268-69, 281).
In any event, a process of rejection can also be observed on the State level. There are several 
initiatives on the regional as well as on the national level to reduce the impact of the ICC. A 
pertinent example on the national level involves the efforts in the DRC to improve the criminal 
justice system, in regard of the prosecution of war crimes described.66 Efforts on the regional 
level are more ambiguous. In 2012, the African Union Assembly Meeting considered a draft 
amended protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights67 which 
intended to extend the Court’s competence to prosecute individuals for international crimes 
62  See above 3.2.3.
63  Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des 
Regierens? Finanzierungsantrag 2014 - 2015 - 2016 - 2017, Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin 2013.
64  On the ICC and selectivity, see Cryer (forthcoming).
65  For such a view: Cassese (2012: 496).
66  Kumbu (forthcoming); see for such a prognosis: Cassese (2012: 499).
67  On the role of this court in inducing compliance see Ntoubandi (forthcoming); see also Löffelmann 
(2010: 161).
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by establishing an International Criminal Law Section of the African Court with criminal ju-
risdiction over such crimes as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.68 The draft 
did not mention the relation between the Court and the ICC (du Plessis/Louw/Maunganidze 
2012: 7). The friction between African States and the ICC is partly based on their perception that 
the cases concerning Al-Bashir (Wedehaimanot 2011: 208) and Kenya’s post-election violence69 
formed a kind of ‘top-down’ intervention by the ICC, which prompted domestic rejections of 
prosecuting those responsible (du Plessis/Louw/Maunganidze 2012: 9). On the other hand, there 
are voices which hold that the split between the AU and the ICC over the Al-Bashir case serves 
interests of African heads of States because they are trying to protect themselves from the dan-
ger of prosecution (Jalloh et al 2011: 8).
Since both aspects have a role to play, there is interest in the involvement of NGOs. An ex-
ample for such involvement is the South African legislation. Under Art. 38 of the Constitution, 
NGOs have a standing ‘to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights 
has been infringed or threatened’. They may request investigations and challenge the prosecu-
tion’s refusal to do so before the courts (du Plessis/Louw/Maunganidze 2012: 11). This concept 
of NGO-standing was confirmed by South Africa’s High Court in the Zimbabwe Torture Docket 
case. In the case, which was launched by the South African Litigation Centre, the Court con-
firmed that South Africa had jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Zimbabwe under 
the concept of universal jurisdiction, and that the South African ICC Act70 removed immunity 
ratione personae for government officials.71 Thus, while the ICC is a clear symbol for the In-
ternational Community’s willingness to take over responsibility for enforcing the laws of war 
where States fail to do so, it also demonstrates the limits of this approach. State empowered in-
stitutions remain subject to governments’ interests, which may be constrained by international 
politics. There is a strong presumption that effective enforcement requires a multilevel system, 
involving not only the State, regional and international institutions, but also NGOs which help 
to limit sovereignty concerns.
On the basis of an empirical study, Reed Wood submits that threats of criminal prosecution 
might not direct armed groups’ behaviour at all. Starting from his analysis that violence against 
civilians serves short-term interests to guarantee a group’s survival, he argues that these inter-
ests and a group’s strategy are hardly influenced by a threat of future prosecution (Wood forth-
coming). Indeed, especially during an on-going armed conflict, immediate reactions will be 
necessary in order to address actors that predominantly pursue short-term interests (Dinstein 
68  African Union, Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General on 
Legal Matters (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 7-11 and 14-15 May 2012) Draft Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 of 15 May 
2012.
69  Sriram/Brown (2012: 219); see on the crisis: Sharma (2012: 27-38). 
70  Republic of South Africa: The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Act 
No. 27 of 2002), 18 July 2002.
71  North Gauteng High Court: Southern African Litigation Centre and Others v. The National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others (77150/09) [2012] ZAGPPHC 61; 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 (GNP); [2012] 3 All SA 198 
(GNP) (8 May 2012).
A Turn to Non-State Actors  |  28
2010: 253 et seq.). While international criminal law aims at creating a real threat of coercion, its 
partly retroactive nature consequently limits some of its effects. Thus, a system built on penal 
sanctions alone would indeed be defunct. Under the conditions of the present international 
system, with its strict limitations on belligerent reprisal, an immediate and real threat of coer-
cion may only be sustained by the UN Security Council (Oeter 1997: 215).
4.1.2 Shortcomings in the Security Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy?
The UN Security Council has increasingly established its competence to enforce international 
humanitarian law. Although it has to be kept in mind that the Security Council is a political 
body with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, its com-
petence is broad enough so that the Council can act as an enforcement organ of international 
(humanitarian) law if the violation of the law amounts to a breach of or a threat to peace. Ef-
forts of the UN Security Council to enforce international humanitarian law began with its first 
thematic resolution on civilian and armed conflict.72 Today there are a number of measures 
contributing to the enforcement of international humanitarian law (Nolte 2005: 489; Roscini 
2010: 330). Important instruments include the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave 
violations against children in armed conflict according to UNSC Resolution 1612 (26 July 2005), 
as well as the so-called ‘List of Shame’, which is accompanied by targeted sanctions against per-
sistent violators. In the case of children and armed conflict, the Secretary-General uses the so-
called List of Shame annexed to his reports to the Security Council, wherein he lists those who 
persistently commit the six grave violations in relation to children and armed conflict.73 The 
Security Council also imposes targeted sanctions against persistent violators of international 
humanitarian law, which are then integrated into existing sanction regimes. As of late 2012, six 
out of thirteen sanction regimes listed violations of international humanitarian law as relevant 
criteria. The sanctions impose travel bans and financial measures on individuals in Libya, the 
DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan.74 Another response of the UN Security Council 
to persistent violations of international humanitarian law can be seen in the gradual changes 
in its peacekeeping system. Currently, a mandate for the protection of civilians is included in 
most of the UN Security Councils situation specific resolutions.75 Civilian protection has be-
come a central function of UN peacekeeping missions.
However, from an empirical perspective, the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, as well as 
of targeted sanctions, is controversial. There are several studies which demonstrate that peace-
keeping operations tend to lead to an increase in violence against civilians inflicted by armed 
groups (Bussmann/Schneider 2010: 6 et seq.; Hultman 2010: 29). Denis Tull has shown how 
MONUSCO failed to fulfil its protection mandate in the DRC, for example (Tull forthcoming). 
72  UNSC Resolution 1296 (19 April 2000); UNSC Resolution 1539 (22 April 2004); Krieger (2006: 107).
73  These six grave violations include killing or maiming of children, recruitment or use of child soldiers, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, abduction of children, attacks against schools 
or hospitals and denial of humanitarian access to children.
74  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 22.
75  Ibid.
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Likewise, Reed Wood has demonstrated that partial and half-hearted foreign interventions may 
have reverse effects, prompting rebel groups to use more violence against civilians. He names 
the examples of interventions against the LRA in 2008 and Sierra Leone in 1998, both of which 
resulted in increasing numbers of civilian victims (Wood forthcoming). However, these find-
ings do not imply that the UN should not intervene to end civil war and protect civilians; they 
require that planning operations and the corresponding strategies respond to these dangers. 
Some studies submit that the operation’s mandate is the decisive starting point and consider 
the extension of the mandates to protect civilians as a major step towards better compliance 
(Bussmann/Schneider 2012: 25). Other studies consequently view UN peacekeeping more posi-
tively (Fortna 2004: 269; Melander 2009: 389; Lamp 2011: 260). Eventually, the UN peacekeeping 
missions will face problems similar to those faced by other actors involved in inducing com-
pliance, like a lack of financial and material resources, as well as personnel, so that only insuf-
ficient numbers of troops with often insufficient equipment will be able to be deployed.
In the case of the sanction regimes, there are notorious examples of persistent violators that 
evade the UN sanctions system, with Ntaganda Bosco being a particularly prominent case in 
the DRC.76 Empirical research suggests that ‘targeted sanctions are much more effective in sig-
nalling or constraining a target than they are in coercing a change in target behaviour’.77 Al-
though UN individually targeted sanctions appear not to be as efficient as anticipated, under 
certain conditions they can still generate a change in behaviour. This is the case if they pursue 
a narrowly defined goal, such as turning over suspects, if they are immediately imposed as 
a reaction to a breach of a rule and if they are part of concerted actions including other ac-
tors. Thus, there appears to be a stronger compliance-pull if actions follow earlier sanctions 
issued by regional bodies78 and if they are part of a larger pattern of enforcement, including the 
presence of peacekeeping missions and referrals to legal tribunals.79 For effectiveness, actions 
need to target those responsible for decision-making, preferably listing few people, since moni-
toring will be more effective in such a case (Wallensteen/Grusell 2012: 216). This observation 
corresponds to the finding that it is, normatively speaking, relatively expensive to rely exclu-
sively on sanctions and rewards because, like governments, the international community has to 
spent meaningful resources on monitoring if it wants to make sanctions work (Levi/Sacks/Tyler 
2009: 355; Schmelzle 2011: 10 et seq.). Civil society exerting strong pressure for resolute inter-
national action is therefore a further prerequisite for UN sanctions’ effectiveness. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of these actions strongly depends on the general perception of the UN 
Security Council’s legitimacy (Peters 2011: 26). Quite like the ICC, the UN Security Council is of-
ten accused of selectivity. The selectivity reproach refers to the choice of situations in which the 
76  List of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paras. 13 and 15 of UNSC Resolu-
tion 1596 (18 April 2005), as renewed by para. 3 of UNSC Resolution 2078 (28 November 2012), see http://
www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/pdf/1533_list.pdf; see also Wallensteen/Grusell (2012: 225).
77  Targeted Sanctions Consortium (ed.), Designing United Nations Targeted Sanctions (April 2012), p. 14; 
Shagabutdinova/Berejikian (2007: 70); Wallensteen/Grusell (2012 223).
78  Targeted Sanctions Consortium (ed.), Designing United Nations Targeted Sanctions (April 2012), p. 17.
79  Ibid.; Wallensteen/Grusell (2012: 222).
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Council is prepared to determine that violations of international humanitarian law constitute 
a threat to peace,80 as well as the choice of the law that it enforces. Thus, it has been suggested 
that the Council has promoted the enforcement of Geneva Law more than that of Hague Law 
(Cryer 2006: 274; Roscini 2010: 353). However, even if the Security Council furthers law enforce-
ment, the Council remains competent to act with a wide nearly unfettered discretion, and the 
maintenance of peace remains the primary goal of its activities, topping other goals and con-
siderations like enforcing international humanitarian law.
The perception that the selectivity and inactivity of the Security Council in certain cases is not 
owed to a responsible exercise of its discretion, but is rather arbitrarily based on short-sighted 
national interests, is at the centre of present day international law. It has led to academic and 
political debates on how far the Security Council’s and third States’ discretion is curtailed by 
legal obligations. While there is a competence (permissive authority) for the International Com-
munity to enforce international humanitarian law via the ICC and Chapter VII of the Security 
Council, what is in question is whether and under what conditions there is also a duty to act. 
The most prominent attempt is the development of the concept of the responsibility to pro-
tect.81 States are legally responsible for their citizens’ welfare. However, if they fail in this res-
ponsibility, whether out of sheer unwillingness or lack of capability, the international com-
munity obtains a – moral, political or even legal – responsibility to become involved or even to 
intervene (von Arnauld 2009: 24 et seqq.; Bellamy 2011: 10; Risse/Börzel 2012: 15). However, at 
the present stage of international law, the responsibility to protect does not create an obligation 
of the United Nations, the Security Council or individual States to act if the national State has 
failed, let alone to intervene militarily. At best, the subsidiary responsibility to protect might be 
described as an emerging rule of customary international law (Peters 2011: 26), the emergence 
of which is still disputed, given that the UN Secretary-General stated in his 2012 Report on Pro-
tection of Civilians in Armed Conflict that ‘the responsibility to protect is a political concept’.82 
Moreover, the responsibility to protect is not identical with the enforcement of international 
humanitarian law. The latter is concerned with the most egregious violations of human rights, 
in particular genocide,83 whereas the former might remain below this threshold. Moreover, in-
ternational humanitarian law applies in times of armed conflict, while the responsibility to 
protect is applicable in times of peace and war alike.
80  UNSC, 6151st meeting (26 June 2009) UN Doc. S/PV 6151 Statement of the Representative of Australia, 
p. 13: ‘However, there is clearly a need for greater consistency in the Council’s approach. Too often still, 
the Council appears unwilling to address the plight of civilians in many internal armed conflicts, not-
withstanding the obvious destabilizing effects and regional consequences of such conflicts. In failing 
to do so, the Council falls short of its obligations under the Charter. […] What is lacking at times, as we 
know, is the political resolve of the Council to use those tools to protect civilians and of the broader 
membership to support such Council action.’
81  See from the vast literature on the responsibility to protect: Hoffmann/Nollkaemper (2012); Nasu 
(2011); Orford (2010); Peters (2011).
82  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 21.
83  Ibidem, 5 et seq.
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For the enforcement of international humanitarian law in times of armed conflict there is a 
more specific norm in Article 1 of the GC, which obliges States ‘to ensure respect for the present 
Convention in all circumstances’.84 However, whether these obligations entail an obligation for 
State parties which are not participating in a particular armed conflict to ensure respect by other 
States and armed groups is highly disputed. Likewise, it is far from clear which measures States 
would have to take in such a case. Robin Geiss has suggested, on the basis of an analysis of the 
pertinent State practice, that Common Article 1 GC indeed possesses a collective-compliance 
dimension (Geiss forthcoming; Brollowski 2012: 95 et seqq.), including States as well as non-
state actors (Geiss fortchcoming). He expands on this premise by arguing that the obligation 
to ensure respect should be seen as ‘a continuous obligation to monitor compliance combined 
with a duty to take positive steps in reaction to serious breaches of humanitarian law obliga-
tions erga omnes during armed conflict’ (Geiss forthcoming). In such a case, ‘States are obliged to 
do what can reasonably be expected of them’ (Geiss forthcoming). This would include acting in 
co-operation with the United Nations according to Article 89 AP I. However, Common Article 1 
GC would not impose a duty ‘to vote positively for whatever resolution is contemplated in the 
Security Council as a response to serious violations of international humanitarian law’ (Geiss 
forthcoming). Thus, within a legal system still based on the consent of those who are bound by 
the rules, inertia can hardly be overcome by creating new legal rules.
4.2 Rewards and persuasion: The increasing role for non-state actors
Therefore, international law might envisage a turn to alternative actors using an alternative 
instrument: persuasion by non-state actors. ‘Persuasion and discourse’ draws on the logic of 
consequences as much as on the logic of appropriateness. At first glance, it aims to induce 
voluntary compliance through arguing and learning, but without affecting the targeted actor’s 
interests. In the practice of the international system, however, persuasion is often directly com-
bined with incentive-based mechanisms, and both mechanisms depend on each other (Risse/
Börzel 2012: 3 et seq.). 
As a soft compliance procedure, persuasion by institutions, such as Geneva Call and the ICRC, 
fits into the general compliance paradigm of international law. There is, among States in gen-
eral, only a limited acceptability of hierarchical forms of compliance control. States prefer non-
confrontational compliance mechanisms which rely on the fear of loss of reputation, since 
hierarchical law enforcement is considered to be too interfering (Bothe 2008: para. 142). More 
importantly, the ICRC and Geneva Call enjoy a greater flexibility than the State-empowered 
and dependent UN system. While the ICRC and Geneva Call can continuously adapt their line 
of argumentation to the exigencies of the particular conflict, UN institutions are forced to act 
with stricter coherence because they issue their findings publicly and also issue definite legal 
determinations (Ratner 2011: 489). At the same time, States will exert more political pressure 
within the United Nations in order to influence the context of such findings in their interest 
84  For an analysis of Common Art. 1 GC see: Boisson de Chazournes/Condorelli (2000: 68, 76 et seq.); 
Kessler (2001: 506 et seq.); Gasser (1993: 15-21); Palwankar (1994: 10); Azzam (1997: 68).
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(Zaum 2009: 26). There is also greater flexibility from an organizational point of view, in that 
smaller informal institutions can react more quickly, and they do not need to pursue their aims 
via administrative channels in the States concerned (Zaum 2009: 26). Correspondingly, there is 
no need for feedback to the hierarchical UN organizations through time-consuming processes 
of co-ordination. In addition, the low media profile adds to this flexibility since there is less 
pressure to succeed. Thus, these institutions can invest time in building up stable relationships 
(Schneckener/Hofmann forthcoming). On the other hand, if required, they have sufficient pos-
sibilities to mobilize public opinion (Mampilly forthcoming). Moreover, for institutions such 
as Geneva Call, instilling compliance is easier insofar as it can concentrate on a single or only 
few issues, unlike UN institutions, which promote a complex legal system. For some years, for 
example, Geneva Call has only concentrated on the banning of anti-personnel mines. Focusing 
on a clearly delineated goal makes compromise easier and dialogue less complex (Schneckener/
Hofmann forthcoming).
However, empirical findings on the effectiveness of these approaches are contradictory. Buss-
mann and Schneider have suggested in an empirical study that the work of the ICRC does not 
induce compliance effectively, if at all: 
‘‘Even if we test for the possible endogeneity of ICRC activities, we cannot find 
evidence that the ICRC presence in conflict zones makes a crucial difference and 
that especially rebel leaders are not deterred from pursuing one-sided violence 
as an integral part of their military campaigns. … training seminars which are 
provided by the ICRC do not have the desired effect and that the presence of the 
ICRC is associated with more rather than fewer killings.’ (Bussmann/Schneider 
9-11 2010: 1, 17 et seq.)’
However, the results of such empirical studies must be viewed with caution. While the Rwandan 
genocide demonstrates the limits of persuasion (Lamp 2011: 257), these cases cannot and should 
not be generalized. Improvement in compliance as a consequence of the ICRC’s involvement 
may be indirect and belated (Lamp 2011: 283). Its effects are difficult to prove, variables for em-
pirical research difficult to determine. Accordingly, it will remain unclear whether a situation 
would even have been worse without the ICRC’s intervention. This is partly a consequence 
of the ICRC’s confidentiality, since few actors will be prepared to admit that they changed 
their behaviour due to the ICRC’s intervention (Ratner 2011: 483). Finally, cases such as Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, on which many empirical studies are based (Bussmann/Schneider 2012: 24-29), 
can be seen as a turning point in the international community’s approach to inducing compli-
ance. Failure in these cases cannot be pinned to the ICRC alone. Many of the concepts currently 
being discussed, such as the role of Geneva Call, International Criminal Justice and UN Security 
Council activities, are a direct response to the experiences of the 1990s.
However, certain deficiencies in the work of NGOs cannot be ignored. Due to their limited 
financial and personal resources, NGOs’ efforts might not be sustainable (Schneckener/Hof-
mann forthcoming). An organization such as Geneva Call can only be successful in a clearly 
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circumscribed legal field, such as a ban on anti-personnel mines. If it tried to tackle the whole 
set of rules on the laws of war, Geneva Call would face the same difficulties as State-empowered 
international organisations. In addition, NGOs have become increasingly dependent on finan-
cial support from their seat States, impairing armed groups’ perceptions of their impartiality 
(Zaum 2009: 28). This perception of impartiality has also been tainted by NGO contributions 
to peace-building efforts; their work appears to be increasingly political (Zaum 2009: 33 et seq.). 
Moreover, unlike within the UN system, NGOs’, and to a certain extent also the ICRC’s, efforts 
to persuade and to use incentives cannot be directly backed by a threat of coercion, e.g. targeted 
sanctions.85 There are no direct and intentional ways available to co-ordinate the effects of dif-
ferent compliance instruments. By contrast, the ICRC explicitly pursues a policy not to share its 
information and observations with the ICC. At the same time, armed groups might be reluctant 
to grant access because they might be anxious that violations will be detected and reported. A 
certain level of scepticism on the side of armed groups apparently remains (Jo/Bryant 2013: 247). 
Moreover, what armed groups might perceive as independence and impartiality might be seen 
as instrumentalisation by State actors (Zaum 2009: 23). Many States actively oppose efforts to 
engage more with armed groups. In particular, the criminalization of internal armed conflicts 
through the paradigm of terrorism restricts the wider legal margin which NGOs enjoy. The 
most striking example is US legislation, according to which ‘it is a federal crime to knowingly 
provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization’.86 Since material sup-
port encompasses training and expert advice or assistance, activities of NGOs, efforts of the 
ICRC or Geneva Call to disseminate international humanitarian law, to provide legal advice or 
to assist with the disposal of landmines might be covered by the legislation. Groups classified 
as terrorists include(d) the PKK and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). American 
NGOs have challenged the prohibition on the basis that it violates their rights under the Fifth 
and First Amendment of the US Constitution, particularly because the regulation prohibits 
engaging with armed groups by training ‘members to use international law to resolve disputes 
peacefully; teaching PKK members to petition the United Nations and other representative 
bodies for relief ’. However, the US Supreme Court considered the statute to be constitutional.87 
Such practice does not only hinder humanitarian organizations from engaging with armed 
groups, but also aims to reduce their reputation. Accordingly, the practice of the US has at-
tracted international criticism. The UN Secretary-General expressed his concern about such 
measures88 and ‘urge[d] all Member States to refrain from adopting national legislation, poli-
cies or other measures that have the effect of inhibiting humanitarian actors in their efforts to 
engage non-State armed groups for humanitarian purposes, including to undertake activities 
aimed at promoting respect for international humanitarian law’.89 His approach was supported 
85  For the channels of NGOs’ access to the UN, see Hobe (2010: paras. 26 et seq).
86  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 US _ 2010; 18 U. S. C. § 2339 B (a) (1), USA Patriot Act.
87  Ibidem.
88  Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, above note 8, para. 46.
89  Ibidem, para. 76.
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by Switzerland in the 2012 Security Council discussion on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, where the Swiss the representative called:
‘on the Council and Member States to take into account the potentially negative 
effects of certain measures and legislation adopted while pursuing the legitimate 
goal of fighting terrorism. It would be regrettable if those measures complicated or 
even prevented the establishment of a dialogue for purely humanitarian purposes, 
prevented access to vulnerable populations by humanitarian staff or weakened 
respect for international humanitarian law by armed groups.’90
5. Conclusion: Patterns of inducing compliance
The international community responds to the challenges which conflicts in war-torn areas of 
limited statehood pose for compliance with international humanitarian law by allocating com-
petences to actors other than the State concerned. In this respect in particular, international 
organizations increasingly contribute to enforcing international humanitarian law. However, 
these organizations remain dependent on their member States’ political willingness to support 
measures for inducing compliance effectively. Therefore, a proliferation of non-state actors can 
be observed that step in where third States and international organizations are reluctant to act. 
Because armed groups in particular perceive these NGOs, including the ICRC, as neutral, they 
can significantly contribute to inducing compliance by using the instruments of persuasion. In 
such cases, traditional motives rooted in the logic of consequences, as well as appropriateness, 
are still valid and must therefore be addressed by the corresponding compliance mechanism.
 
These compliance mechanisms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, forming a pat-
tern of inducing compliance. Persuasion apparently relies at least partly on a direct and real 
threat of coercion. Persistent violators in particular can hardly be reached by persuasion. As 
much as national law works on the basis of an intertwined system of coercion and persuasion, 
inducing compliance with international law requires a mix of instruments. Even if these in-
struments are not purportedly combined, they are mutually reinforcing insofar as persuasion 
and discourse are used by non-state actors that act under a shadow of hierarchy. The concept 
of a shadow of hierarchy has been developed in social sciences and describes the observation 
that, in national systems, public and private actors usually bargain and collaborate under such 
a shadow of hierarchy. The shadow describes the indirect influence that hierarchical enforce-
able decisions of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government exert on private 
actors. The concept of shadow refers to threats of these institutions to adopt, enact or enforce 
adverse legislation or decisions if private actors do not change their behaviour (Hèritier/Lehm-
kuhl 2008: 2). Within the international community, persuasion and incentives work more ef-
fectively if they are used under a shadow hierarchy created by coercive legal enforcement instru-
90 UNSC, 6790th meeting (25 June 2012) UN Doc. S/PV 6790, Statement of the Representative of Switzer-
land, p. 32.
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ments, such as international criminal justice, UN targeted sanctions and peacekeeping efforts. 
These instruments are in turn more effective if they are accompanied by a concerted effort and 
not used as isolated measures in an isolated context. Thus, it is not only a shadow of hierarchy 
which furthers inducing compliance in cases of persuasion. Legal enforcement will also be 
more successful if it is accompanied by persuasion. Inducing compliance is done through all 
these different means, often applied concurrently. The choice of instruments will depend on 
the inducer using them (Ratner 2011: 493). The inducer’s choice is determined by legal as well as 
social considerations, and the alternatives are delineated by legal competences and limitations, 
as well as by the anticipated impacts the instruments might have on the addressee’s behaviour. 
Therefore, the inducer must take into account the special circumstances of conflicts in areas of 
limited statehood, as well as the special circumstances of the international system. 
It needs to be borne in mind that, unlike other non-state actors, which are held captive by do-
mestic rules, the behaviour of armed groups can, at least during an on-going conflict, only be 
dealt with by international law, since these groups are fighting the national (legal) system, which 
accordingly cannot be enforced against them (Sassóli 2007: 63). If international humanitarian 
law shall be enforced, there is no real alternative other than to engage with the armed groups. 
Improving civilian protection in war-torn areas of limited statehood requires accommo- 
dating the interests of armed groups, as much as State interests. In particular, empirical stud-
ies demonstrate that efforts by the international community to protect civilians may entail 
serious consequences for civilians, if these efforts work against the conflict dynamics and over-
turn political developments in the territory concerned (Wood forthcoming; Mampilly forth-
coming). Mechanisms for inducing compliance must respond to these findings.
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